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AM I MY CLIENT? REVISITED: THE ROLE OF RACE IN
INTRA-RACE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Julie D. Lawton*
This Article examines the challenges of intra-race legal representation for
lawyers of color, law students of color, and those teaching law students of color by
analyzing how the dynamics of the lawyer’s and client’s racial sameness impact
legal representation. This Article brings together three strands of lawyering theory
– the role of race in lawyering, critical race theory, and the role of the lawyer in
intra-race legal representation. In doing so, this Article explores a number of pro-
vocative questions: Does being the same race as their clients make lawyers better
legal representatives? Should lawyers of color embrace or resist race’s influence on
intra-race legal representation? How do lawyers balance their desire to remain repre-
sentative of their race with their responsibility to their clients? This Article also
scrutinizes the role of the lawyer of color in intra-race legal representation by exam-
ining questions that are under-reviewed, such as: Do lawyers of color engage in the
same explicit and implicit biases against their clients of color that lawyers of color
similarly suffer? Do racial stereotypes tempt the lawyer to be more sympathetic
towards, and understanding of, their same-race clients, or does it cause the lawyer
to view the same-race client as an ‘other’? For lawyers of color and clients of color
who seek same-race legal representation, this Article explores a difficult question—
Is the lawyer of color representative enough of the race to be a representative for the
client, particularly when the lawyer of color and the client of color live in different
socio-economic environments? Given the resurgent examination of the role of race
in interactions between persons of color and persons of power, this Article presents a
timely opportunity to examine and question the role of race and the impact of
divergent socio-economic status in intra-race legal representation.
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I enter the room and see them gazing at me. I notice the slight sur-
prise, the pride, the relief. I am an African-American attorney working in
community development in predominantly African-American communi-
ties. I am here to be their lawyer, but I am often perplexed trying to define
that role. I, like many lawyers of color, struggle with the dynamics of our
roles as lawyers to members of our racial community.
As attorneys of color, when we walk into community and client
meetings and see the faces of color before us, we hear the murmurs. We
see and hear from them the gratitude for the personification of their sacri-
fice—the long hours working the hardest jobs for the lowest pay; the years
of enduring discrimination to give us, their children, and their unborn
grandchildren, chances for better lives. The precious, hard-earned coins
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dropped into collection plates to support their kids and neighbors’ kids at
historically black colleges and universities, often the only colleges that
would admit them. Their lost hope renewed when they see those of us
who “made it.”
We often see in their eyes our reflection, though many of us struggle
with the question of what it is that we see. Do our clients of color see an
‘other’ when they gaze upon us or do they see a reflection of themselves,
one of their own? Do they expect more of us because we are of the same
race?
We are torn by their expectations, verbal and unspoken, as well as
our own. We want to be for them what we think they need. We want to
fix the problems they face, in part because they endured them to enable
our opportunities. We have the legal training to help them. We received
this training, in part, because they fought for our right to obtain it. So,
when we represent them, what do we owe? How do we retain our legal
objectivity under the weight of such responsibility?
In identifying and examining the dynamics that attorneys and clients
of color must contend with in intra-race legal representation, this Article
not only serves as an important tool for reflection and insight for attorneys
of color managing these dynamics, it will also be instructive for those
teaching current and aspiring attorneys of color to help prepare them to
navigate these issues in practice. Non-lawyers of color can also benefit
from exposure to these issues as colleagues and opposing counsel to attor-
neys of color.
In 1996, Nancy Polikoff wrote a powerful article, Am I My Client?
The Role Confusion of the Lawyer Activist.1 In this article, Polikoff examined
the conflicts she felt as a lesbian activist attorney representing clients who
shared her demographics, goals, and personal challenges. Her article ex-
amined her role confusion from her work as a lesbian activist seeking to
maintain her position as an insider to this demographic while also trying to
remain an objective legal representative of other lesbian activists. In her
article, Polikoff describes her connection to the lesbian activist community
and her solidarity with their civil disobedience to fight injustices against
that community. However, she struggles with how to continue her activ-
ism while simultaneously acting as an attorney to that community. Her
activism for her cause requires a civil disobedience against the law that is in
stark contrast to the objective analysis and often peaceful compliance re-
quired of her as an attorney. This tension reflects what she calls her role
confusion between whether she can remain an ‘insider’ to the lesbian ac-
tivist community or whether the non-activist requirements of her as an
attorney will cause her to be an ‘outsider’ to that group. The raw honesty
of her prose moved me the first time I read it ten years ago, and it contin-
1. Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client? The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1996).
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ues to inform my thoughts on the role confusion I experience as an Afri-
can-American attorney working in African-American communities.
Part I of this Article introduces the concept of intra-race legal repre-
sentation and provides some background for the author’s examination of
this issue. Part II uses the author’s experience as a framework for the attor-
ney of color and similarly provides a framework for the client of color
through the prism of the ‘race client’ – the attorney’s race as a client of the
attorney of color. This section of the Article further examines how same-
race attorneys and clients pursue racial solidarity through intra-race legal
representation and seek to identify with each other through their racial-
sameness. Part III presents competing arguments on the role of race in
inter-race legal representation, contrasting arguments for race-neutral
lawyering and racially-conscious lawyering. Part IV examines whether race
similarly impacts intra-race legal representation and closes with an analysis
of the risks and perilous challenges lawyers and clients of color must navi-
gate in intra-race legal representation. The Article concludes with a per-
sonal reflection of a question each attorney of color must contemplate in
same-race lawyering: Am I my client?
I. INTRA-RACE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Intra-race legal representation occurs when lawyers represent clients
who share the same racial demographics as the lawyer. There are unique
dynamics to intra-race legal representation that give rise to this Article.
Race is a charged term even though it is considered a social construct,
rather than a biological construct.2 Psychologists consider race “the cate-
gory to which others assign individuals on the basis of physical characteris-
tics, such as skin color or hair type, and the generalizations and stereotypes
made as a result.”3 Race, particularly for people of color, affects many
aspects of life.4 For attorneys of color, race becomes an inextricable part of
who we are, how we view the world, and how the world views us.5 Attor-
neys of color overwhelmingly descend from groups who historically have
suffered racial oppression. As a result, individuals from these groups
2. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines on Multicultural Education, Training, Research, Prac-
tice, and Organizational Change for Psychologists, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 377, 380 (2003).
3. Id.
4. Shani King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services Organiza-
tions Need African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (“Race, espe-
cially for African Americans has a gravity that cannot be understood if taken out of its socio-
political-legal and historical context.”).
5. See Russell Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1632 (1993) (quoting Clayton P. Alderfer & David A. Thomas, The
Significance of Race and Ethnicity for Understanding Organizational Behavior, INT’L REV. INDUS. &
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 1, 6–7 (Cary L. Cooper & Ivan T. Robertson eds., 1988))
(“[I]ndividuals are shaped by at least three sets of forces: their own unique personalities, the
groups with whom they personally identify to a significant degree, and the groups with whom
others associate them—whether or not they wish that association.”).
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bonded together in resistance against this oppression.6 This bond continues
to impact the personal and professional interactions between people of
color, including between attorneys of color and clients of the same race.7
For many attorneys of color, this shared racial history is stained with
oppression and discrimination that continues to impact our racial commu-
nities and, thus, our interactions with it.8 Our shared history can create a
deep sense of obligation for attorneys of color to our racial communities.
We must balance this sense of obligation with the ethical obligations we
have sworn to uphold in a profession that encourages us to be color-blind
in our legal representation. Lawyers of color must struggle with how to
remain integral parts of our racial communities while practicing in a pro-
fession that is dominated by individuals who neither look like us nor gen-
erally share our life experiences. This shared history and these struggles
impact how I navigate my role as a woman of color, an attorney of color,
and an attorney regardless of my color. To provide perspective on these
experiences, I will share some of my background and experiences and the
experiences of my clients to use as a framework to examine the attorney
and client of color.
II. THE ATTORNEY AND CLIENT OF COLOR
A. Who Am I?
I stand in the shadows and on the shoulders of giants. I am the Afri-
can-American, female child of two college graduates, and the grandchild
of two college graduates with graduate degrees. As such, I am no stranger
to education and opportunity. I am also no stranger to privilege. Mine is
not a story of a person of color rising through a low-income background
of hardship to accomplishment. I was raised in an upper-middle class sub-
urb of Atlanta, knowing neither hunger nor helplessness. I am the first
lawyer in my family, but I received my undergraduate degree, my law
degree, and my master of laws degree on merit scholarships. Upon gradua-
tion from law school, I practiced law at one of the country’s largest law
6. King, supra note 4, at 10–11 (“Black Americans are ‘connected’ in that they recognize
that there are negative representations and stereotypical images of black Americans floating
around. At the same time, black Americans are connected in a deeper way as they are a people
fighting for recognition of their own absolute humanity; a humanity that stands in stark contrast
to these negative representations.”).
7. Pearce, supra note 5, at 1633–34.
8. See, e.g., Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrim-
ination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 182-83
(2008) (stating that more than one-third of Blacks and nearly 20% of Hispanics and Asians re-
ported that they had personally been passed over for a job or promotion because of their race or
ethnicity; stating that research shows that those who perceive high levels of discrimination are
more likely to experience depression, anxiety, and other negative health outcomes; stating that
perceived discrimination may lead to diminished effort or performance in education or the labor
market).
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firms, making unseemly sums of money for one so young, and I currently
teach law, making unseemly sums of money for one so happy in her pro-
fession. I am, on almost every professional level, a success story.
During my early life, I never questioned my acceptance or place in
the African-American community9 and took great comfort in this.  The
differences in members of my community have always paled in comparison
to our shared historic struggles of slavery, racism, and discrimination and
the battles against the internal pathologies we continue to face as a com-
munity.10 Because of our shared history and experiences, and my comfort
in belonging, I felt this solidarity with my race as we collectively fought to
support and protect each other to break from the vestiges of slavery. I
never anticipated that this sense of racial solidarity would be at risk. I
watched as others in my community were cast as outsiders, but I rational-
ized that the extremity of their behavior explained why members of my
community felt the dis-ownership was necessary.11 But I never felt any
differences between my community and me that were significant enough
to make me an outsider. I attended a primarily African-American elemen-
tary school, high school, college, and law school. During these early years
of my life, I did not have as full an appreciation for how our divergent
experiences could splinter my cherished racial solidarity. It was not until I
attended law school at Howard University, a historic and predominantly
African-American university, that my perspective began to change.
Howard University School of Law holds a special place in the history
of African-Americans because it is the former home of John Mercer Lang-
9. See Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identifica-
tion, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1992) (describing “the black community,” as once “a place
where people both lived and worked” and now “more of an idea, or an ideal, than a reality.”).
10. See, e.g., Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW RE-
SEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gap-be-
tween-whites-and-blacks-widens/ (stating that Black men were more than six times as likely as
White men to be incarcerated in federal and state prisons, and local jails in 2010); Economic News
Release, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/.release/.t02.htm (showing an 8% June
2016 unemployment rate for African-American men over the age of 20, twice that of White
men over the age of 20); Health of Black or African American non-Hispanic Population, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, http://www.cdc
.gov/ nchs/fastats/black-health.htm (showing that almost 60% of African-American women over
the age of twenty are obese); Eileen Patten & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Black Child Poverty Rate
Holds Steady, Even as Other Groups See Declines, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch
.org///07/14/black-child-poverty-rate-holds-steady-even-as-other-groups-see-declines/
(showing that almost 40% of Black children lived in poverty and were almost four times as likely
as White or Asian children to be living in poverty in 2013, and significantly more likely than
Hispanic children).
11. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, For Clarence Thomas, Another Invitation and Another Flap,
WASH. POST, June 18, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national///stories/
wpthomas061898.htm (noting a number of African-American organizations and a prominent
African-American former U.S. Appeals Court Judge who disavow African-American U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Clarence Thomas because of his views on issues seen as important to the
African-American community).
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ston12 and Thurgood Marshall,13 amongst many others. While my deci-
sion to attend Howard was primarily a financial one,14 I expected to feel at
home amongst other African-American law students. I expected that,
amongst other law students of color, I would feel a kinship in striving
toward the common goal of practicing law. Soon after my arrival at How-
ard, some students informed me that I did not “belong” there, primarily, I
was told, because of my economic status. While in law school, I lived in a
small, comfortable apartment in a building that was within walking dis-
tance from the law school; I had a car that, while not new, was safe; I was
not required to work because what extra funds I needed, my parents could
provide. Because of my economic position growing up and while in law
school, I was told that I did not have the “typical black person’s experi-
ence.” I was informed that I was one of the “haves” while they were the
self-designated “have-nots.” I was not one of them. Suddenly, in an environ-
ment where I assumed acceptance and camaraderie, fellow members of my
race sought to cast me as an outsider.
Not surprisingly, I fought back against this idea of a universal or even
typical “black person’s experience” or that all persons of the same race
should have the same experience to belong. I objected to the idea that the
absence of this singular experience delegitimizes one’s membership in that
racial community. I resisted my classmates’ assumptions that their struggles
made their place in our community more secure. At the time, I wondered
what it was about their experiences that led them to feel the need to dic-
tate that their experience was the only pure experience. Had my family
and I not economically suffered or sacrificed enough to ‘belong’? While
shared sacrifice often contributes to a sense of belonging, was it necessary
for acceptance in a community suffering from oppression? If so, who de-
termines how much sacrifice is sufficient? Whose experience establishes
the metric for acceptance?
This divergence continued as I began practicing at a large law firm.
The vast majority of my colleagues and clients were White and affluent. As
many attorneys of color working in similar environments, I was function-
ing in a world of people with whom I had professional, educational, and
income similarities, but no racial connection.15 I was left to navigate this
12. Active in the abolitionist movement before the Civil War, John Mercer Langston was
a central figure in the struggle for gaining voting rights and other opportunities for freed slaves.
He helped establish Howard University and was the inaugural dean of Howard University School
of Law. See generally BLACK LEADERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Leon Litwick & August
Meier eds., 1988).
13. Widely known for his work as an attorney in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.
294 (1955), Thurgood Marshall was the first African-American U.S. Supreme Court Justice and
a graduate of Howard University School of Law. See generally GLENN L. STARKS & F. ERIK
BROOKS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: A BIOGRAPHY (2012).
14. Howard offered me a full-tuition, merit-based scholarship, plus a living stipend.
15. Pearce, supra note 5, at 1634 (“In contrast, in an organization or society where women
or people of color are often found in low status positions and less frequently in high status
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work environment and profession in which my race is an unalterable char-
acteristic of my person, though it is expected to be an irrelevant aspect of
my legal analysis and professional responsibility. It raised questions: How
do we, as attorneys of color, balance our race-neutral professional obliga-
tions with a need to maintain our racial solidarity? How must we conduct
ourselves to be accepted by our colleagues and our clients without being
cast as an outsider to our race?
A few years after leaving my law firm job, I accepted a low-paying
teaching fellowship at Georgetown University Law Center. I bought a
house in the Trinidad neighborhood, a gentrifying, predominantly Afri-
can-American neighborhood in Washington, D.C. I expected, as I did
when matriculating into Howard’s law school, a racial solidarity in my
own racial community. However, soon after moving into the neighbor-
hood, the impact of different socio-economic backgrounds became evi-
dent as my neighbors and I had opposing reactions to the pathologies of
poverty in my new neighborhood. When one of my neighbors attempted
to break into my home, my reaction was to call the police; my neighbors’
reactions were to criticize me for potentially sending someone from the
neighborhood to jail. When I caught a neighborhood teenager smoking
marijuana in the alley behind my house, my reaction was to challenge him
to understand the legal and health consequences of that behavior. His reac-
tion was genuine confusion and indignation that he was being criticized
because, as a high-school graduate working a full-time job without an ar-
rest record, he was, he argued, a success in that neighborhood. When a
large number of young men in the neighborhood were arrested for partici-
pating in a drug ring, my reaction was relief and gratitude that a source of
crime was, at least temporarily, eliminated. A young neighbor’s reaction
was sadness at the loss of his friends who, he insisted, “were good guys.”
With each event, the only commonality we had in our reactions was sur-
prise at the other’s. Although I intellectually knew that my racial commu-
nity was not monolithic, these experiences established my evolving
understanding, though not yet acceptance, of the diverging definitions of
those considered “insiders” and those cast as “outsiders” within a single
community.
While living in the Trinidad neighborhood of Washington, D.C., I
worked for a number of years helping low- and moderate-income tenants
in multi-family apartment buildings purchase their buildings when the
owners put those buildings up for sale. When tenants received notice that
they could purchase their apartment buildings,16 they hired attorneys, such
position [sic], a professional woman or person of color would be incongruently embedded and
therefore face greater internal and external tension between group and professional
identity. . . .”).
16. The D.C. Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE §§ 42-3401–42-3405.13
(2001) (requiring landlords to provide tenants with the opportunity to purchase residential rental
units and buildings when landlords put their property up for sale. This statutorily controlled
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as myself, to help them navigate this legal transaction.17 As part of this
process, I worked primarily in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods
in mostly African-American communities. I enjoyed working in these
communities because I helped residents—who were often financially un-
stable—to become homeowners, which could then lead to financial secur-
ity. It offered renters in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, who
were often oppressed and disenfranchised, the ability to exercise some level
of control over their housing and, thus, the direction of their lives. I was
able to offer my skills and experience to the African-American commu-
nity, who I viewed as my race client18: a community to whom I felt such a
powerful sense of obligation that my obligation to it rose to that of a client.
This experience again raised some questions—my clients here, as my
clients at the law firm, expected professional and objective legal counsel
regardless of my race. However, does representing clients of color change
the role race should play in legal representation? If so, in a country so
mired in race, how does one remove the influence of race from legal analy-
sis and representation, particularly as an attorney of color? Do we, as attor-
neys of color, have a greater responsibility to ensure that our representation
is race-neutral or a greater responsibility to ensure that neither our col-
leagues, nor our same-race clients, nor we, forget the impact of race? Fur-
ther, how do attorneys of color navigate the legal representation of
members of our communities when there are such divergent views of who
is an insider? What role should our race play in our efforts to be a lawyer
for members of a community who may not even view us as one of their
own?
B. The Race Client
For many attorneys of color, our race is an integral part of our iden-
tity.19 While some are raised to view themselves as separate and apart from
their race, many of us are raised with an intense sense of connection to our
racial community.20 Our intense sense of connection gives rise to a per-
process begins with a notice of the landlord’s intent to sell and the tenants’ opportunity to
purchase).
17. See generally Julie D. Lawton, Tenant Purchase as a Means of Creating and Preserving Af-
fordable Homeownership, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 55 (2012) (examining the DC
Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act, including the role of attorneys working with tenants as-
sociations navigating the process).
18. Julie D. Lawton, Who Is My Client? Client Centered Lawyering with Multiple Clients, 22
CLINICAL L. REV. 145, 176–80 (2015); see also infra Section II.B.
19. David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility,
57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1532–33 (1998) (“Racial identity—and in particular African American
racial identity—constitutes this kind of powerful social force. Race exerts a major influence over
every significant aspect of the lives of black Americans . . .  The essential point is that in today’s
America, race matters in ways that inevitably structure identity.”).
20. Id.  (“[Race] literally colors the way that we are perceived by the world at the same
time that it shapes our self-perceptions. As a result, blacks are inextricably bound together, both
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sonal urgency to support and serve members of our race as individuals and
to protect our racial collective. For many of us, this personal duty creates
what I describe as a “race client”.21 I have previously described a race
client as follows:
As a lawyer governed by a professional code of ethics, I
have a professional obligation to my clients. However, because
of my ardent belief in the opportunities provided by homeown-
ership and my personal sense of obligation to my African-
American community, I also have a deep sense of obligation
and personal duty to these causes as well. I remain a fervent
advocate for affordable homeownership—so much so that af-
fordable homeownership became the legal policy cause for
which I advocate. Because I feel a personal duty to empower
members of my race as individuals and as a group, the cause of
supporting and protecting members of my racial community as
individuals and as a collective became my race client. I have, in
essence, 3 clients—my individual corporate client, my cause
client and my race client.22
Same-race legal representation can be an attempt by the lawyer and
the client to reinforce an undeniable bond—a historic, common struggle
against racial discrimination and oppression. Many attorneys of color fight
against this historic oppression by serving their race client.23 As further
explained in the next section, an attorney of color’s service to the race
client can be accomplished by representing individual clients of the same
race or representing corporate clients whose membership, ownership, or
purpose imbue the corporation with the same racial identity as the attor-
ney of color.
1. Representing the Race by Representing the Racial Corporation
During my practice representing tenants in Washington, D.C., my
clients were tenants associations, as opposed to individual tenants.24 I
worked with individual tenants seeking to become first-time homeowners,
but they accomplished that goal by forming a tenants association, which
in the sense that the actions of individual blacks impact the opportunities of other blacks, and in
the manner in which the opportunities available to all blacks are tied to the fate of the black
community as a whole.”).
21. Lawton, supra note 18.
22. Lawton, supra note 18, at 146.
23. Id.
24. Susan Bennett, Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Train-
ing in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469, 473 (2002) (“Technically, when you re-
present an entity, you are representing a representation: the aspirations of a created community,
expressed through a mission statement necessarily made flesh through its elected or appointed
articulators.”).
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was my client. The tenants association was the entity through which the
tenants negotiated the purchase of their apartment building, obtained
loans, and received my counsel. Although these corporate entities were
ostensibly race-neutral entities, these types of corporations were typically
formed almost exclusively by residents of the same race to help them ac-
complish goals specific to the protection, support, or furtherance of mem-
bers of that race. In this regard, the corporations were not race-neutral in
their ownership or purpose. Rather, they were entities with a corporate
race.25 For many attorneys of color, these racial corporations are the vehi-
cles through which we serve our racial communities. Community devel-
opment corporations formed by residents of color to redevelop their
neighborhoods or non-profits formed by members of a racial community
to protest the treatment of its members are but two examples. Attorneys of
color are able to serve our race clients to effect social change by represent-
ing these corporations.26 Through these racial corporations, individual
members are able to leverage their collective power to achieve change in
communities that might otherwise suffer. In same-race legal representa-
tion, these racial corporations also create an avenue for trust. For attorneys
of color, these racial corporations are not only the entities through which
the individual members of our race accomplish their dreams of social
change, but they are also the vehicles through which attorneys of color
accomplish goals of supporting and protecting our racial communities.
2. Representing the Race by Representing the Individual
Attorneys of color most often represent a race client by representing a
same-race individual client or working with the individual members of the
racial corporation. The racial corporation may be the client, but the indi-
vidual members of those corporations are the ones with whom the attor-
ney interacts. Regardless of the actual form of the client, it is either the
individual member of the corporation or the individual client who dem-
onstrates the racial connection and solidarity that many of us seek in same-
race legal representations. It is the individuals that pull us aside, tell us of
their pride, and give us their trust.
These individuals trust us with their dreams of social or financial
change. They want attorneys of color to be different from other lawyers
whose racial bias27 often left them disappointed and distrustful of “outsid-
25. Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2025 (2006); see
also Lawton, supra note 18, at 159–60 (discussing a corporation’s racial identity).
26. Steve Bachman, Lawyers, Law and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
1, 21 (1984) (“The primary motor of social change is social struggle, not legal struggle. . . The
lawyer’s role is more the oiler of the social change machine than its motor; the motor of the
machine remains masses of people.”).
27. See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012) (examining implicit bias in
prosecutorial decisions and arguing that such bias skews prosecutorial decisions); cf. Jean
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ers.” Our clients look to us to represent them well because of our profes-
sional responsibility, but also, I suspect, because of our racial commonality.
However, should race play a role in client-attorney interaction?
III. THE ROLE OF RACE IN INTER-RACE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
A. Color-Blind Legal Representation
1. The Model Rules’ Race Neutrality
One argument is for a lawyer to be color-blind in legal representation
and analysis. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”) prohibit a lawyer’s racially discriminatory be-
havior28 and require a lawyer to offer candid advice to a client.29 They are
purportedly race-neutral and “are explicitly cast in universalist terms that
purport to apply to all lawyers in all contexts.”30 Thus, “non-professional
identity” characteristics, such as race, are omitted.31 The Model Rules al-
low the lawyer’s advice to include other considerations such as “social and
political factors.”32 They also recognize that “moral and ethical considera-
tions impinge upon most legal questions”33 and that a lawyer’s racial iden-
Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter
Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS., 393–429 (2012) (study showing consumer bankruptcy
attorneys demonstrate racial bias against Black debtors); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson,
Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004) (examining the
implicit bias of death penalty lawyers); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. Rev. 1124 (2012) (describing implicit bias in the courtroom, including judges and attorneys);
Abigail Hauslohner, Why a Law Meant to Protect the Poor From Gentrification Doesn’t Really Work,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/why-a-law-
meant-to-protect-the-poor-from-gentrification-doesnt-really-work////—11e5—e2d1b4289c2f
_story.html (describing how poor tenants who receive the opportunity to purchase their apart-
ment building are often left in deplorable living conditions to coerce them to vacate the building
for more profitable development).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.8.4. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“It is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic
status in conduct related to the practice of law.”).
29. Id. r.2.1 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but
to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client’s situation.”).
30. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1504.
31. Id.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.2.1. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
33. Id. r.2.1. cmt. 2 (“It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the
law will be applied.”).
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tity often impacts a lawyer’s morality and ethics.34 However, aside from
race as an ancillary consideration to these factors, the Model Rules do not
expressly permit a lawyer to allow race to impact the lawyer’s representa-
tion of a client.
2. Other Arguments for Race Neutrality in Legal Representation
The arguments for race neutrality are based on the idea that the rule
of law is an impartial application of impartial rules.35 The theory is that a
judge or jury will apply the same set of rules to an objective review of the
facts without regard to the parties’ respective races or other personal char-
acteristics.36 In this paradigm of race neutral lawyering, the legal system
would adjudicate cases based solely on the similarity of the facts of the
case, with no consideration of the races of the litigants or of any implicit
racial dynamics that might impact a case’s outcome.
In support of color-blindness in the law, Chief Justice John Roberts
argued, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”37 Admittedly, this idea that race
would impact a case only when the impact is intentional is appealing to a
lawyer’s sense of fairness and neutrality. It creates the impression that elim-
inating intentional and blatant racial discrimination will enable participants
in the legal system to stop discriminating on the basis of race. Based on this
theory of race neutrality, eradicating the impact of race is achievable if we
simply choose to “stop discriminating on the basis of race,” which, theo-
retically, means rejecting the consideration of race.38
For some, eliminating the consideration of race is not only achieva-
ble, but also preferable. Years ago, William Van Alstyne, a law professor at
Duke University, wrote:
Rather, one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a
complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to toler-
ate . . . in the life or practices of one’s government—the differ-
ential treatment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that is
the great lesson for government itself to teach; in all we do in
life, whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than
another or to favor any more than another for being black or
34. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1508 (“[T]he obligation thesis—that is, of course, the
proposition that racial identity is relevant to moral obligation.”).
35. Roland Acevedo, Edward Hosp & Rachel Pomerantz, Race and Representation: A
Study of Legal Aid Attorneys and Their Perceptions of the Significance of Race, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L. J.
1, 5 (1999–2000).
36. Id.
37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
38. Id.
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white or brown or red, is wrong. Let that be our fundamental
law . . .39
In his oft-quoted article about Jewish identity in lawyering, Sanford
Levinson, an accomplished legal scholar, also argued for race-neutral lawy-
ering as ideal, stating:
The triumph of what might be termed the standard version of
the professional project would, I believe, be the creation, by
virtue of professional education, of almost purely fungible
members of the respective professional community. Such ap-
parent aspects of the self as one’s race, gender, religion, or eth-
nic background would become irrelevant to defining one’s
capacities as a lawyer.40
Another author, Professor Russell Pearce, also describes race-neutral
lawyering as “the ideal of the rule of law, with its aspiration for a legal
system based on neutrality, impartiality, and the treating of like cases alike
and different cases differently.”41
While race neutrality in the legal justice system and client-lawyer
interaction may be appealing to those subscribing to the concept of Justice
is Blind,42 others argue that lawyers should acknowledge the impact of race
and work within those confines. The following section sets forth argu-
ments for race consciousness in lawyering.
B. Racially Conscious Legal Representation
In contrast to the idea of race-neutral lawyering, some authors en-
courage lawyers to understand that race, whether in inter-race lawyering
or, as this Article examines, in intra-race lawyering, influences the lawyer’s
and the client’s interaction with each other and to incorporate that under-
standing in their lawyering.43 Vanessa A. Edkins, a psychology professor,
39. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809–10 (1979).
40. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Profes-
sional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578–79 (1992–93).
41. Pearce, supra note 5, at 1628.
42. But see Justice Is Not Blind, AM. C.L. UNION (May 4, 2000), https://www.aclu.org/
news/justice-not-blind; LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: RA-
CIAL DISPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, http://www.protectcivil
rights.org/pdf/reports/justice.pdf (reporting the racial disparities in various aspects of the crimi-
nal justice system).
43. Deborah N. Archer, There Is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of Teaching the Next Gener-
ation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a “Post-Racial” Society, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 55, 69 (2013)
(“With the current approach to cross-cultural lawyering, the goal is to make consideration of the
lawyer’s and client’s culture a normal part of the lawyer’s thought process.”); Paul R. Tremblay,
Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 383
(2002) (“As many have written, and as the above definition of culture suggests, all counseling is
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published a study suggesting that the client’s race influences the lawyer’s
negotiations for a plea bargain for criminal offenses.44 Writing with two
other professors, Professor Alexis Anderson notes that racial similarities and
differences affect how lawyers and clients perceive each other.45 When
lawyers see “sameness” in their client, whether that sameness is based on
race, economic background, or life experiences, lawyers are inherently
more likely to value, trust, and work with those clients more than those
clients lawyers view as different.46 This inherent preference for sameness
can then impact a lawyer’s intentions to be race neutral is his or her
lawyering.
Instead of race-neutral lawyering, Professor Bill Ong Hing exhorts
lawyers to recognize the race and other demographic traits of clients.47 He
argues that cross-cultural lawyering can be effective, but “only with full
consciousness, sensitivity, and constant work.”48 Similarly, Professor
Deborah Archer exhorts lawyers to become skilled cross-cultural lawyers
by not only recognizing the client as a racial being, but also examining the
lawyer’s own views about race.49 These views, she argues, can influence
the lawyer’s legal analysis, review of the facts, and assumptions of responsi-
bility.50 Professor David Wilkins has gone so far as to argue that not only
does race play a role in lawyering, but also that African-American lawyers
have a right to consider their moral responsibilities to members of the
African-American community in their role as lawyers.51
Other authors also perceive a disconnect in lawyering when lawyers
ignore the role of race and argue it is particularly problematic when the
cross-cultural—even an interaction between a male, WASP lawyer from Newton Centre, Massa-
chusetts and his male, WASP client from the same city.”).
44. Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous
Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413 (2011).
45. Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & Carwina Weng, Challenges of “Sameness”: Pitfalls
and Benefits to Assumed Connections in Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 339, 341 (2012) (“Uncon-
sciously, we categorize people into groups—in-groups whose members share characteristics with
ourselves, and out-groups whose members appear different from ourselves. This categorization
affects how we perceive other people . . . .”).
46. Id.
47. Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender,
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808
(1992) (“In teaching about good community lawyering, I stress that lawyers need to be conscious
of the class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, possible physical disability, and age of the
attorney, the client, their allies, their enemies, and other institutional players.”).
48. Id. at 1824.
49. Archer, supra note 43, at 69–70 (“Moreover, a skilled cross-cultural lawyer must not
only acknowledge her client’s race, but also the way her own attitude about race and racism may
impact her interactions with her client, her examination of the legal and factual issues presented
in the case, the course of action selected, and the attribution of blame.”).
50. Id.
51. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1521.
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race of the lawyer and the client is different.52 In examining this issue,
Professor Michelle Jacobs recognized the challenges lawyers have in com-
municating with clients when the race of the client is different from the
race of the lawyer.53 She argues that cultural differences in communication
might interfere with the ability of the two to communicate.54 Jacobs
noted: “[I]f the inhibiting factor is the race of the lawyer, and/or the
lawyer’s expectations regarding the client and the clients’ culture, knowl-
edge of the facilitators will not provide the lawyer with the tools to break
through the barrier.”55 She maintains that challenges in lawyer-client
communication actually occur because lawyers assume an ability to reach
the client regardless of cultural differences, and the inability to do so is
generally assumed to be because of the client’s insufficiencies and not be-
cause the lawyer lacks cultural sensitivity.56
Professor Carwina Weng similarly contends that there is a need for
cultural sensitivity in lawyering, because racial differences can affect how
the lawyer and client interact. In a recent article, she recounts a story in
which she represented a woman that had a restraining order out against her
husband.57 The client told Weng that Weng could not understand the cli-
ent’s life because the client “bounced from shelter to shelter with a small
bag of clothes” whereas Weng had “a loving husband and drove a new
car.”58 Weng surmised that the client equated Weng with the “other privi-
leged and powerful service providers in her life, who were investigating
and seemingly judging her life and behavior.”59 Weng suggests that she
was able to be a culturally sensitive lawyer by making an adjustment in her
lawyering.60 In this instance, she adjusts by “acknowledging explicitly the
class and personal differences” between herself and her client and by ver-
52. Ong Hing, supra note 47, at 1809–10 (“This class difference is likely to be apparent
even if I were from a poor background myself, because my poor background would likely be
different from that of Ms. Pierce’s and, in reality, my education has changed me, especially in the
eyes of Ms. Pierce. I must be conscious of my manner of speech and the setting in which the
interview is conducted. In attempting to develop a rapport with Ms. Pierce, I must be aware of
the subject matter of any small talk. The difference in our racial and ethnic backgrounds may also
make it more or less likely for her to open up to me. Our gender difference is a variable in our
rapport as well. However, by knowing more about her race and culture and by being cognizant
of our differences, I may avoid making inappropriate assumptions and establishing false expecta-
tions and thereby improve my ability to communicate with her.”).
53. Michelle Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Coun-
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bally reinforcing the client’s authority in the case.61 Professor Susan Bryant
similarly argues, “a competent cross-cultural lawyer acknowledges racism,
power, privilege and stereotyped thinking as influencing her interactions
with clients and case planning, and works to lessen the effect of these . . .
influences.”62
Others have also argued that a refusal to recognize the impact of race
makes a lawyer less effective.63 Russell Pearce concludes that efforts to
“bleach-out” issues of race have a significant negative impact on a lawyer’s
practice, particularly that of White lawyers.64 Similarly, Paul Tremblay
notes, “all counseling is cross-cultural”.65 Professor Shani King goes fur-
ther, arguing that cross-cultural competence is an insufficient bridge in
intra-race lawyering and that instead, organizations must hire same-race
lawyers for clients of color to bridge the cultural divide.66
Other professions also recognize the impact of race and culture on
professional interactions.67 The American Psychological Association en-
courages psychologists to recognize how their culturally based attitudes
and beliefs can negatively impact their professional interactions.68 The
medical profession recognizes the impact of racial and cultural differences
on the doctor-client relationship and has called for a more diverse medical
workforce in an attempt to address these issues.69 The American Dental
Education Association argues that culturally sensitive patient care enables
dental “providers to respond to the sensibilities of patients whose cultures
and values may be very different from their own.”70
These legal scholars and other professionals provide compelling argu-
ments for race-conscious lawyering. Another argument for the legal pro-
fession’s recognition of the impact of race on lawyer-client relationships is
61. Id.
62. Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 55 (2001).
63. E.g., Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of
Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2089 (2005) (“Despite the persistence of racial identity group
influences, white lawyers tend to deny the influence of their racial identity group on their work
as lawyers. When professionalism’s ideological commitment to color blindness reinforces this
tendency, the resulting symbiosis undermines the capacity of white lawyers to represent clients to
the best of their ability.”).
64. Id. at 2091.
65. Tremblay, supra note 43, at 383.
66. King, supra note 4, at 5–6 (“Second, I argue that legal services organizations will be
most effective in serving African-American clients if they have African-Americans on staff. In
other works, cultural competence training in legal services organizations is not enough.”).
67. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
68. Am. Psychol. Ass’n, supra note 2, at 382–85.
69. Warren J. Ferguson & Lucy M. Candib, Culture, Language, and the Doctor-Patient Rela-
tionship, 34 FAM. MED. & COMMUNITY HEALTH 353, 353 (2002).
70. Am. Dental Educ. Ass’n, Need for Diversity, DENTISTRY 101, http://www.adea.org/
GoDental/Dentistry_101/Need_for_diversity.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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how differently African-Americans and White Americans view the impact
of race on the implementation of the law. For example, in an interview
conducted in 2013, George Washington University Political Science Pro-
fessor John Sides noted that African-Americans were “extraordinarily
skeptical” of the fairness of the criminal justice system, while Whites per-
ceived the criminal justice system as “color-blind.”71 Professor Sides notes
a number of reasons for the disparity in views about the criminal justice
system, including the vicarious experiences of many African-Americans
with acquaintances who had negative experiences with the law.72
The foregoing arguments are persuasive. Reflecting on the study by
Professor Sides, it is illogical to presume that such divergence of views
about the impact of race does not exist within the legal profession. Race
impacts a lawyer’s representation of a client, just as race impacts a client’s
interaction with the law and the lawyer. The impact of vicarious exper-
iences is persuasive as well. It is reasonable to expect that experiences of
lawyers’ acquaintances with clients of color similarly impact how lawyers
view their clients of color. For example, when lawyers hear stories of their
colleagues’ negative interactions with clients of color, comments by col-
leagues about judges’ differential treatment of white defendants and de-
fendants of color, and vicarious experiences of colleagues’ interactions
with the sheer number of people of color as defendants in criminal courts,
how do these experiences not impact how a lawyer views his or her own
clients of color? These experiences all likely influence a lawyer’s views of
race and the law and, thus, the lawyer’s interaction with, and legal repre-
sentation of, clients of color.
Professor Pearce similarly agrees that race-neutral lawyering is a fal-
lacy.73 He argues that a lawyer’s group identity will influence how the
lawyer interprets the world, the lawyer’s work, and how the lawyer inter-
acts and relates to others, including clients.74 He thus concludes, “facially
group neutral standards of conduct are not neutral” because these standards
“will inevitably have group identification content, most probably the per-
spective of dominant identity groups.”75 As other scholars have noted, the
assumption of race neutrality in legal representation would require a shift-
71. John Sides, White People Believe the Justice System Is Color Blind. Black People Really




73. Pearce, supra note 5, at 1634.
74. Id.
75. Id. (“[I]ntergroup theory asserts that group identity influences the way we as lawyers
and judges look at the world and at our work, and how we relate to other people within the legal
system. Therefore, facially group neutral standards of conduct are not neutral. They will inevita-
bly have group identification content, most probably the perspective of dominant identity
groups.”).
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ing of indifference to race by attorneys, clients of color, and third parties
that has not, to date, been shown to exist.76
IV. THE ROLE OF RACE IN INTRA-RACE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
A. Does Racial Sameness Matter for Effective Legal Representation?
Members of the same race identify with each other more than mem-
bers of other races.77 There is an argument that such a shared cultural
heritage improves the lawyer-client connection and communication.78
Does this, in turn, make a same-race lawyer a better lawyer for that client?
Attorney Kenneth Troccoli relates a story about an African-American cli-
ent represented by a White public defender, who tells the public defender
that the client prefers an African-American lawyer.79 The public defender
responds that he is an experienced criminal lawyer and intends to vigor-
ously represent the client regardless of racial similarity or differences.80 The
client persists, arguing that his experiences have shown rampant racism in
the treatment of African-American men in the criminal justice system,
which an African-American attorney would more clearly recognize.81 The
client, adamant about the impact of race on the attorney-client representa-
tion, “explains that an African-American lawyer will be better able to un-
derstand and appreciate the circumstances that resulted in the bringing
of . . . charges and that he, the client, can trust a Black lawyer more than a
white one.”82 Does the most effective legal representation necessitate
same-race lawyering?
76. Acevedo et al., supra note 35, at 15–19. On some level, I am intrigued by this idea of
uniform treatment of individuals of different races—this idea that we, as a society, will see the
individual, not the cover; that we will always evaluate each race, culture or religion the same as
we do our own. However, my choice—my need—to protect and support my racial community
is not unique. This self-protection over the course of history continues. As long as we are more
inclined to protect our “own,” we are more likely to protect others we view as being like our-
selves to the disadvantage of others we do not view as like us. But see RENATO ROSALDO,
CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 103 (1993) (“Even when they
appear most subjective, thought and feeling are always culturally shaped and influenced by one’s
biography, social situation, and historical context.”).
77. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 341 (“[A]utomatically, we might exaggerate differ-
ences among groups and favor our in-group over any out-group. Our preference for our own in-
group leads us to value, trust, and work with members of our in-group more than we do mem-
bers of an out-group. Hence the seduction of sameness.”).
78. Bryant, supra note 62, at 41 (“As we recognize these individual differences, we also
know that sharing a common cultural heritage with a client tends to improve our predictions and
interpretations and to reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings.”).
79. Kenneth Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black Defen-
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Is a lawyer with the best experience the best lawyer for a client, even
if that lawyer has no demographic similarity to, or personal understanding
of, the group? Or, does a recognition that race impacts the attorney-client
relationship mean that a lawyer with less experience, but who is reflective
of the group’s demographics, is a better lawyer for a client? Many years
ago, Charles Hamilton Houston, former Dean of Howard University
School of Law, noted that the “primary social justification” for the Afri-
can-American lawyer in this country is “the social service he c[an] render
the race as an interpreter and proponent of its rights and aspirations.”83
Does our shared race alone make African-American lawyers the best legal
representatives for African-Americans?
A few years ago, in examining these questions, lawyers with the New
York Legal Aid Society’s Civil Division, studied other New York Legal
Aid Society lawyers’ expressed beliefs on the impact of race on attorney-
client legal representation.84 White attorneys and attorneys of color had
differing views on these issues. A majority of the attorneys of color be-
lieved that clients are more open with attorneys of the same race as the
client.85 However, White attorneys overwhelmingly thought that same-
race lawyering did not impact effective legal representation.86 White attor-
neys argued that the skill, commitment and willingness to listen were more
instrumental in effective representation; qualities, one attorney noted, not
tied to race.87
Open debate continues on this issue. Former Federal District Judge
Harold Baer, Jr. supported the premise that same-race attorneys are needed
for the most effective lawyering.88 In the judiciary, however, he was virtu-
ally alone in this argument.89 This debate became public in a recent string
of cases decided by Judge Baer.90 In Martin v. Blessing,91 Sirius Satellite
Radio, Inc. and XM Satellite Holding, Inc. sought to merge into a larger
company to be called Sirius XM Radio, Inc.92 Subscribers of the compa-
nies argued that the merger was an antitrust violation and, after some liti-
83. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1503 (quoting GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 218 (1983)).
84. Acevedo et al., supra note 35, at 24–61.
85. Id. at 40–43 (noting that 57% of surveyed attorneys of color agreed that clients are
more open with attorneys of the same race and 41% of White attorneys disagreed, and also
noting that 73% of White attorneys, but only 42% of attorneys of color disagreed that attorneys
of color are more effective representatives of people of color).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 42.
88. Michael H. Hurwitz, Judge Harold Baer’s Quixotic Crusade for Class Counsel Diversity,
17 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 321, 324–27 (2011); infra note 98.
89. Hurwitz, supra note 88, at 327.
90. Martin v. Blessing, 134 S. Ct. 402 (2013); infra note 97.
91. 134 S. Ct. 402 (2013).
92. Id. at 402.
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gation, sought to be certified as a federal antitrust class.93 One of the
requirements for certifying the class was that the class needed adequate
class counsel, as determined by factors set forth in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.94 The rule allowed the lower court, in addition to other
determinants, to “consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability
to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”95 Judge Baer,
the lower court judge, required that the law firms appointed as class coun-
sel “ensure that the lawyers staffed on the case fairly reflect the class com-
position in terms of relevant race and gender metrics.”96
This was not Judge Baer’s first judicial ruling requiring class counsel
to be reflective of the gender and racial dynamics of the class.97 In a previ-
ous case involving J.P. Morgan Chase, Judge Baer also required diversity in
the racial and gender demographics of the law firms representing the
class.98 Class counsel, he reasoned, was more of a “judicially appointed
fiduciary” and less of a private attorney hired by the litigants and, thus, the
counsel should be more representative of the class—in this case, at least
one “minority” lawyer and one woman lawyer with requisite experi-
ence.99 Judge Baer’s opinions make clear that he believed that race matters
with regard to effective legal representation.100
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
96. Martin, 134 S. Ct. at 402.
97. In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 242 F.R.D. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
see also Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 96 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the
proposed class counsel did not submit any information such as “firm resume, attorney biogra-
phies, or otherwise” to satisfy this requirement, and requiring counsel to submit “evidence of
diversity, in terms of race and gender, of any class counsel” (citing In re J.P. Morgan, 242 F.R.D.
at 277)).
98. In re J.P. Morgan, 242 F.R.D. at 277. (“The proposed class includes thousands of Plan
participants, both male and female, arguably from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. There-
fore, I believe it is important to all concerned that there is evidence of diversity, in terms of race
and gender, of any class counsel I appoint. A review of the firm biographies provides some
information on this score. Here, it appears that gender and racial diversity exists, to a limited
extent, with respect to the principal attorneys involved in the case. Co-lead counsel has met this
Court’s diversity requirement—i.e., that at least one minority lawyer and one woman lawyer
with requisite experience at the firm be assigned to this matter.”).
99. Id. (“Appointment of class counsel is an extraordinary practice with respect to dictat-
ing and limiting the class members’ control over the attorney-client relationship and thus re-
quires a heightened level of scrutiny to ensure that the interests of the class members are
adequately represented and protected. Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District has aptly
compared the role of class counsel to that of ‘a judicially appointed fiduciary, not that of a
privately retained counsel.’” (quoting Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992,
1106–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2006))).
100. See Hurwitz, supra note 88, at 328 (“It is unclear why Judge Baer believes that the
counsel’s racial and gender diversity would facilitate his or her ability to represent the class, but
perhaps it is because Judge Baer believes that a minority or female counsel would be better able
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The lawyers in Martin v. Blessing sought a writ of certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which was denied. However, Judge Baer’s insistence
on gender and racial diversity spurred a written opinion supporting the
denial of certiorari, although opposing Judge Baer’s reasoning. In his re-
sponse to the writ of certiorari, Justice Alito vehemently rejected the argu-
ment that race matters in how effectively a lawyer can represent a client.101
To the contrary, Justice Alito cast Judge Baer’s practices of requiring racial
diversity as unconstitutional racial and gender discrimination.102
The New York Legal Aid Society’s lawyers, Judge Baer’s opinions,
and Justice Alito’s responses to those opinions are just some examples illus-
trating a question that many lawyers of color struggle with: Does being the
same race as one’s client improve a lawyer’s effectiveness?103 Professor
Mortazavi supports this proposition.104 In response to Justice Alito’s posi-
tion, Professor Mortazavi argues that “[l]awyers are more likely to serve
clients fairly and adequately when there is some overlap between the race
and gender of the class and of the representative legal team.”105 She reasons
that a shared race between the lawyer and client impacts their communica-
tion and spurs a lawyer’s empathy and loyalty.106 Loyalty, she proposes,
“requires trust, a relationship, and candor,”107 traits she argues are more
present when the lawyer and client are of the same race. She promotes the
idea of considering demographic similarities in determining whether a
lawyer “is more likely to adequately and fairly consider” the interests of the
clients.108
to empathize or communicate with class members who share his or her racial background or
gender. But why should that be so?”).
101. Martin, 134 S. Ct. at 403 (“It seems quite farfetched to argue that class counsel cannot
fairly and adequately represent a class unless the race and gender of counsel mirror the
demographics of the class.”).
102. Id. (“Based on the materials now before us, I am hard-pressed to see any ground on
which Judge Baer’s practice can be defended. This Court has often stressed that ‘[r]acial dis-
crimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.’ Court-
approved discrimination based on gender is similarly objectionable, and therefore it is doubtful
that the practice in question could survive a constitutional challenge.” (citation omitted)).
103. King, supra note 4 (arguing that legal services organizations that serve large popula-
tions of African-American clients should employ African-American attorneys).
104. Melissa Mortazavi, Blind Spot: The Inadequacy of Neutral Partisanship, 63 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 16, 21–22 (2015).
105. Id. at 21 (“As an initial matter, clients may trust their lawyers more and therefore be
more forthcoming and candid about relevant facts and concerns. Moreover, such lawyers have
cultural knowledge that allows them to communicate effectively with clients and anticipate con-
cerns and roadblocks. Lawyers that share demographic qualities with their clients are also more
likely to have empathy for their clients and substantive loyalty to their interests.”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 23.
108. Id. at 23–24.
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After reviewing the various arguments, the notion that race does not
impact an attorney’s representation of a client of color is unpersuasive.
While same-race lawyering might not be mandatory for the most effective
representation, the existence of race-neutral lawyering remains elusive.
Race-neutral lawyering may be an ideal goal to some, but arguing that
race is currently irrelevant to a professional interaction suggests a level of
racial objectivity that our county has yet to achieve. Lawyers should recog-
nize that race matters, but so does adhering to the professional require-
ments of zealous representation, regardless of racial identity.109 As
Professor Wilkins noted:
[L]awyers are more than ordinary citizens; they have been
given a monopoly by the state to occupy a position of trust
both with respect to the interests of their clients and the public
purposes of the legal framework. This status is a part of the
moral identity of black lawyers.110
Building on the conclusion that racial sameness impacts intra-race legal
representation but does not necessitate same-race lawyering for effective
representation, this Article will next examine the expectations of lawyers
and clients of color in intra-legal representations. Then, it will evaluate the
attorney of color’s role confusion in intra-race legal representation. It will
conclude with an examination of the risks and resultant unhappy truths of
intra-race legal representation.
B. Lawyer’s Expectations
Any lawyer approaches legal representation with some expectation of
how the representation will unfold. For attorneys of color, intra-race legal
representation can be fraught with expectations. When same-race lawyers
and clients meet, the history of our race is there. Some hope to ignore it
and others embrace it, but it remains. This Article will identify and ex-
amine the dynamics that the attorney of color often expects from these
moments of intra-race legal representation.
1. Lawyer’s Heightened Expectations of Self
Attorneys of color may have heightened expectations of self when
representing members of their own race. The sacrifices of our ancestors
can weigh on attorneys of color, spurring us to greater levels of excellence.
109. Cf. Pearce, supra note 5, at 1635 (“First, as a general matter, explicit conflict between
group identity and the professional role is relatively limited. Most lawyers, whatever their group
identification, generally accept professional norms—including the goal of rule of law—even
where they might conflict with group identification.”); Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1538 (“[T]he
sad fact that the United States is far from achieving the ideal of ‘colorblind’ justice does not
demonstrate that the American legal system is so racist that black attorneys and other participants
in the legal system should consider themselves excused from legitimate role obligations.”).
110. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1539–40.
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For African-American attorneys, it is hard to ignore that we are but a few
generations from slavery and even fewer from the ravages of the Jim Crow
era.111 The recent police killings of unarmed African-American men are a
potent reminder of how close we are to some of the most trying periods in
our nation’s racial history.112 These reminders can prompt lawyers of color
to pursue a higher level of excellence to protect fellow members of our
race without consciously providing lesser service to nonmembers.
Many attorneys of color feel a responsibility to help others of our
race, as many of us have been given so much, and we are often humbled by
the opportunity to serve. While there is debate as to whether our race
alone makes us a better lawyer for them, our same-race clients’ beliefs in us
spur us to be better lawyers.113 However, this self-imposed heightened re-
sponsibility can also create a crisis of confidence.114 The desire to excel in
light of such history can undermine the lawyer’s confidence in her ability
to succeed. Karen Thompson, a lawyer with the Innocence Project, de-
scribes representing a client of the same race as making the attorney of
color feel at once both fearless and incompetent because this trust, while
an empowering endorsement from one’s own community, can be terri-
fying in its responsibility.115 Lawyers of color must manage our expecta-
tions to prevent them from overwhelming us and impacting our legal
judgment. Our clients, regardless of our expectations of self, deserve a law-
yer who can detangle their personal challenges from their lawyering.
2. Conflict Between Racial Solidarity and Professional Obligations
For many attorneys of color, when we meet with same-race clients,
we often seek, and sometimes obtain, a needed racial solidarity.116 I never
111. White Only: Jim Crow in America, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HIST., http://
.si.edu//history/1-segregated/white-only-1.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (describing legisla-
tion known as Jim Crow laws, which permitted segregation in schools, housing, jobs, the right
to vote, and public gathering places).
112. Camila Domonoske & Bill Chappell, Minnesota Gov. Calls Traffic Stop Shooting ‘Abso-
lutely Appalling at All Levels,’ NPR, (July 7, 2016, 7:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/07/07/485066807/police-stop-ends-in-black-mans-death-aftermath-is-live
streamed-online-video.
113. Karen Thompson, Creating Context Through Representation: When the Lawyer Looks like
the Client, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 4, 2015, 5:20 PM) http://.innocenceproject.org/-
through-representation-when-the-lawyer-looks-like-the-client/ (describing how both she and
her clients can briefly succumb to an ingrained societal belief that because African Americans are
inferior they are therefore less capable of performing certain skilled professions).
114. Lynda D. Field et al., No Hay Rosas sin Espinas: Conceptualizing Latina-Latina Supervi-
sion from a Multicultural Developmental Supervisory Model, 4 TRAINING & EDUC. PROF. PSYCHOL.,
47, 49 (2010) (“Role shock is characterized by ‘the imposter phenomenon’ in which the super-
visor does not identify as a supervisor, experiences a crisis of confidence and competence, and is
sensitive to perceived criticism.”).
115. Id.; Thompson, supra note 113.
116. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1535 (“For many blacks, membership in the black commu-
nity is an important source of human flourishing.”); see also Field et al., supra note 114 (examin-
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discouraged my clients from looking to me to be a better lawyer for them
because of my race. I never encouraged them to instead trust more in my
skills and experience than in our shared race. I let those expressions of trust
linger unchecked. I was their lawyer and in that role, I needed them to
trust me. Our sense of solidarity facilitated trust.
In these moments of trust with our clients, attorneys of color can
temporarily forget about the differences that separate us from our commu-
nity. These moments remind us that we are a part of something greater. In
meetings with our same-race clients, there is a familiarity in our conversa-
tions because of our shared history and racial experiences.
For attorneys of color who seek racial solidarity from intra-race legal
representation, a conflict will emerge: the attorney of color’s sworn ethical
obligation to the client will inevitably conflict with the sense of racial soli-
darity that the attorney of color seeks.117 The client’s wishes will not al-
ways coincide with the attorney’s ethical obligation and that can, in turn,
conflict with the sense of racial solidarity the attorney of color may have
felt with the same-race client. However, the lawyer’s legal objectivity must
remain. The need to preserve racial solidarity cannot lessen the objectivity
the lawyer requires for representation. The client, regardless of the client’s
race, comes to the lawyer for guidance and good lawyering. The same-race
client may have heightened levels of trust and greater expectations. Those
expectations and our sense of responsibility to our race may tempt us to
lose objectivity, but we serve our clients best when we give them the best
lawyering we can—sensitive to the racial commonality, yes, but not
blinded by it.
C. Client’s Expectations
In intra-race legal representations, what are some of our clients’
expectations?
1. Client’s Heightened Expectations of Lawyer
In my last article, I recounted an experience from a number of years
ago when I met with a group of tenants about the prospect of representing
them in their efforts to purchase their mid-rise apartment building.118 En-
tering with a White female colleague into a room filled with African-
ing a similar need for same-race support in clinical psychology supervision between Latina
supervisors and supervisees, and describing the resultant challenges).
117. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not expressly permit an attorney to
make legal decisions on the basis of race, so inevitably, a lawyer’s actions on behalf of a client will
turn more on the lawyer’s ethical obligation instead of the lawyer’s racial solidarity. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). For instance, a criminal attorney’s
racial solidarity might tempt the lawyer to protest police brutality against men of color at the
courthouse, but the lawyer’s professional obligation to his clients to be seen as a race-neutral
criminal prosecutor might require the lawyer to avoid such public protests.
118. Lawton, supra note 18, at 177.
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American women, an elderly African-American female resident shouted,
“I want the black lawyer!”119 She knew no more about me than she did
my White counterpart, yet she immediately decided that she wanted me as
her lawyer based on nothing more than my race. What is it that she saw in
our racial connection that made her conclude that I was her preferred
choice? Maybe she wanted to support my practice by ensuring that her
business would go to an attorney of color, but given the importance of the
legal transaction for which her group sought assistance, I find this conclu-
sion unlikely. In her utterance, the elderly tenant expressed an assumption
that I was a better lawyer for her as opposed to my White counterpart for
no other apparent reason than our racial commonality. Ultimately, we did
not represent her group. Therefore, I am left to surmise her contempla-
tions. I assume she expected better representation from me because of our
racial commonality, or expected me to interact with her differently than a
non-African-American attorney would. She wanted me to be her repre-
sentative based on our shared race, but our shared race does not in itself
indicate shared values or shared goals. I could have been, like so many
others, one of the attorneys seeking to take advantage of what is often seen
as a vulnerable group. However, because of our racial commonality, she
assumed I am trustworthy and expected me to be worthy of that trust.
Our same-race clients are the fellow members of our communities
who often expect us to be different than non-members because we are of
the same race. Many clients of color tell us how proud they are of our
accomplishments and how glad they are to see those of us who “made it.”
Some talk about missed opportunities and unfortunate choices that kept
them from achieving their professional goals. Clients will pull us aside dur-
ing and after meetings to share how much better they feel about the legal
issue on which we are assisting now that they have one of their “own” on
their side.120 Phrases such as, “you’re one of us so I know I can trust you,”
or “I know you got us,” remind us of their willingness, their need, to
believe that having a same-race lawyer on their team makes them more
secure.121
This heightened level of trust is beyond the basic trust that we as
lawyers receive from our non-clients of color – there is the additional
weight of the history and continued oppression, segregation, and discrimi-
nation that pulls on attorneys of color. This expectation that we can help
119. Id.
120. King, supra note 4, at 16 (“Black group identity includes a particular sensitivity to
issues of racism and oppression, making it more likely that black clients will initially assume that a
black lawyer is intrinsically ‘on their side’ and is down to ‘fight for them.’”).
121. Id. at 15–16 (“Under these circumstances, many blacks would likely want their case in
the hands of someone who sees the world as they do, someone who can personally identify with
their historical and current struggle in this country as black Americans, and someone who may
be less likely to judge them because they are black. In short, many blacks would want their case
in the hands of an African-American.”).
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more is intertwined with this expectation that we should help more. And
that can be overwhelming, particularly for newer attorneys who are also
learning how to navigate their new role in the profession. Each attorney of
color should work to understand the role they want to assume in their
respective racial communities and retain that as a guide to navigate these
experiences.
2. Racial Betrayal
Intra-race legal representation can also be difficult in that attorneys of
color are expected to conduct ourselves in a manner that does not appear
as a “racial betrayal” or, as Professor Russell described, being viewed as
“sellouts who have abandoned their communities.”122 Same-race clients
often initially look at us as one of their own. Their comments and behav-
ior suggest that they see in us someone who could feel their pain and solve
their problems for them because of the assumption that of course we under-
stand their pain because we are of the same race. The unspoken threat (and
fear) is the expectation that we will protect “our own” against non-mem-
bers lest we be viewed as betraying our racial community. Take the story of
Michael Greene, an African-American lawyer in Charlotte, North Caro-
lina, and presumably an insider to members of our race until late 2015,
when he represented White police officer Randall “Wes” Kerrick on
charges of voluntary manslaughter for shooting an unarmed black man ten
times.123 After Greene’s defense and the jury’s inability to agree on a ver-
dict, the judge declared a hung jury.124 The N.C. Attorney’s office subse-
quently announced they would not seek a new trial and, in September
2015, the charges against Greene’s client, Officer Kerrick, were officially
dropped.125 During trial, some alleged that Greene’s defense of Kerrick
did not focus on the actions of Greene’s client—a police officer shooting
an unarmed man—but, instead, turned into creating a stereotype of the
victim to justify the killing.126 Fellow African-Americans expressed con-
cern that Greene’s defense tactics intentionally caricaturized the victim as
“the big, hulking, angry, scary, black man” to rationalize his client’s
shooting behavior.127 But instead of questioning Greene’s choices as a law-
yer, the critics questioned his loyalty to his race.128 “I question his black
122. Margaret M. Russell, Beyond “Sellout” and “Race Cards”: Black Attorneys and the Strait-
jacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 771–72 (1997). This article also provides a similar
analysis of the criticisms of African-American attorney Christopher Darden as a result of his
prosecution of O.J. Simpson.
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experience in America, his ability to connect with it,” one person
stated.129 “I just think he is a black man who does not want to be black,”
said another.130 “It made me question his upbringing, where he grew up,
how he lived.”131 Suddenly, fellow members of his community who, prior
to this representation, may have thought of him with pride as one of their
own, began to splinter from him—cast him off. In the course of a single
representation, Greene became an outsider.
While Greene argues that he was simply representing his client,132
other members of his community view his behavior as racially traitorous.
The racial solidarity with his community that may have existed prior to his
representation of Officer Kerrick quickly dissipated. Fellow African-
Americans cast him as an outsider because he had, in their eyes, demon-
strated that he did not share the attributes they view as necessary to remain
an insider, in this case: loyalty to the race.
As an attorney, Greene had an obligation to zealously represent his
client,133 but how does that representation coexist with the obligations that
members of our community feel he owes? Within a group, particularly
one as diverse as a racial community, differences will occur.134 How a law-
yer navigates those differences can be a perilous journey of self-awareness
and, at times, a willingness to let go of the comforts of group identity.
D. The Attorney of Color’s Role Confusion
1. Representative of the Race
In intra-race legal representation, how do lawyers and clients deter-
mine whether that lawyer or client is truly one of their own? If racial
sameness does play a role in choosing legal representation, harkening back
to what those students at Howard Law suggested, is there a basis for deter-
mining whether a chosen person is a true representative of the race? For
each lawyer of color, we often ask ourselves – are we representative
enough to be representative of the race?
During the Civil Rights Movement, African-Americans, and those
external to the civil rights struggle, sought to have African-American lead-




132. See id. (“ ‘The evidence is what the evidence is,’ he says. ‘These are the facts of the
case. These were Jonathan Ferrell’s actions, not stereotypes about him as a black male.’” (quoting
Michael Greene)).
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (1983).
134. See Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 389 (“To meet the challenges inherent in same-
ness, we must first acknowledge that we, and our clients, have multiple  identities, some of which
will raise issues of sameness and some, issues of difference.”).
135. KENNETH WALTER MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 5 (2012) (“Both blacks and whites were unsure of exactly what they
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ity of African-Americans had similar backgrounds and experiences,136
having a person who was representative of the race might have been easier
to find. But, now, when we as a people have such varied life experiences
and backgrounds, finding a person who is representative of our race is as
difficult as defining what that would be.137 Like those students at Howard
Law attempting to define their experience as a “typically black person’s
experience,” it is a task with perilous metrics because no singular experi-
ence exists to define as representative.138 Does being representative of the
race require demonstrated racial solidarity, such as publicly supporting a
cause important to the race, regardless of whether the individual lawyer
personally and privately supports the cause?139
Ultimately, attorneys of color must accept that “representative
enough” is a fiction and a false dichotomy between two illusions – “repre-
sentative enough” and not. It is difficult to balance the responsibilities one
feels to one’s race, particularly when trying to balance professional obliga-
tions with racial obligations, and the goals of professional achievement.
meant when they demanded that civil rights lawyers be ‘representatives’ of the minority group.
In an era when segregation limited what most African Americans could accomplish in the world,
a representative black person often had to be as unlike most members of the minority group as
possible. . . At the same time, however, both blacks and whites often demanded that the repre-
sentative be an ‘authentic’ black person—someone as much like the masses of black people as
possible.”). But see Bennett, supra note 24, at 477 (“Something we commonly presume about
‘representativeness’ is that we can gauge it by examining the fit between the composition of an
organization’s leadership and the demography of its neighborhood. In fact, researchers have
taken great care to distinguish ‘substantive representation’—a similarity between an organiza-
tion’s and its constituents’ perceptions of the neighborhood’s needs—from ‘descriptive represen-
tation’— a similarity between an organization’s and its constituents’ demographic and socio-
economic characteristics.”).
136. See MACK, supra note 135, at 20 (“These were the lucky few who had attained
enough education and training to become doctors, dentists, schoolteachers, ministers, and
lawyers.”).
137. King, supra note 4, at 43; Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1534 (“Although discrimination
and segregation are still rampant in late twentieth century America, black Americans can now be
found in virtually every occupation, interest group, and geographic region in the country. Given
this variation, the claim that ‘race’ constitutes a ‘master identity’ that necessarily structures and
defines the lives of all blacks in equivalent and predictable ways is no longer plausible.”).
138. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1534 (“Race constitutes a significant aspect of our identity
without there being any consistent set of narratives that constitute black identity.”). See Kim-
briell Kelly et al., Broken by the Bubble, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/sf/investigative/2015/01/25/in-fairwood-dreams-of-black-wealth-foundered-amid-the-
mortgage-meltdown/ (describing the experiences of an upper-income African-American com-
munity in Prince George’s County, Maryland, which was besieged by predatory lending
practices).
139. Levinson, supra note 40, at 1592 (relating a story by Alan Dershowitz, a Jewish law
professor, about Dershowitz’s refusal to teach on Saturdays when he arrived at Harvard Law
School). Dershowitz had become nonobservant, but his refusal to work on Saturday was more
akin to “ethnic solidarity.” Id. Levinson argues that this action may have protected Dershowitz’s
relationships with the Jewish community or protected Jewish students at Harvard who may have
felt otherwise compelled to attend Saturday classes. Id.
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There is no uniformity to being representative enough in our communi-
ties. The struggle to represent and be representative enough can interfere
with the objectivity so many lawyers of color need to fulfill their profes-
sional obligations. In Representing the Race, Kenneth Mack references John
Mercer Langston and what Langston had in common with others of his
race.140 Am I, as Mack discusses in his introduction, representative enough
to be their representative?141 Am I representative enough for my African-
American clients? The unsatisfying conclusion for the attorney of color is
that there is no clear metric to determine whether a lawyer of color is
representative enough and there is no single answer.
2. Risks in Intra-Race Legal Representation
a. The Risk of Race Manipulation of the Client
For attorneys of color and clients of color, there is often an initial
mutual assumption of trust. Trust between a lawyer and a client is the
cornerstone of effective counsel.142 When there is mutual trust, clients are
best able to make informed legal decisions and lawyers are most effec-
tive.143 Clients may expect that attorneys of color are more trustworthy
because they are of the same race, and attorneys of color may expect that
clients of color will trust attorneys of color more for that same reason.144
Members within the same race trust each other more and are more
likely to work together.145 Shared experiences and shared personal charac-
teristics facilitate a connection between people. Traumatic shared exper-
140. MACK, supra note 135, at 13–15.
141. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 339 (“Untested assumptions, whatever their source,
can impair lawyering judgments. In our collective experience, we have found that assumptions
rooted in sameness are particularly seductive and bring unique challenges to our work.”).
142. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981)) (“[Basic] trust between counsel and
defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel.”).
143. Id. at 21 (“Moreover, counsel is likely to have to make a number of crucial decisions
throughout the proceedings on a range of subjects that may require consultation with the defen-
dant. These decisions can best be made, and counsel’s duties most effectively discharged, if the
attorney and the defendant have a relationship characterized by trust and confidence.”).
144. King, supra note 4, at 4 (“(1) African American lawyers and clients share a group
identity that makes it more likely that a lack attorney will be able to gain a black client’s trust; (2)
black attorneys communicate more effectively with black clients; (3) the perception of a judicial
system that is unfair and racist is likely to encourage black clients to trust black lawyers more than
white lawyers, who are more likely to be perceived as part of ‘the system.’”).
145. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 341 (“Our preference for our own in-group leads us
to value, trust, and work with members of our in-group more than we do members of an out-
group.”).
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iences, such as racism,146 can also create a connection.147 Racism is a
pervasive ill that affects individuals and groups, continues for generations,
and insidiously infects multiple aspects of victims’ psyches.148 The shared
history and personal experiences of members within a group offer an op-
portunity to empathize; in this case, it is an opportunity for empathy be-
tween a lawyer and a client.
Lawyers use multiple tactics to engender trust and stimulate client
disclosure.149 Lawyers endeavor to create connections with their clients to
engender trust and encourage their clients to trust them.150 Lawyers must
remember that clients, particularly low- and moderate-income clients,
often seek out lawyers in times of difficulty and need. This need creates a
vulnerability that can inhibit the client’s willingness to trust and, thus, the
client’s willingness to share information in a manner that will enable the
attorney to effectively represent the client.151 Although some clients are
forthcoming about their legal issues, other clients are resistant to sharing
the details of their legal issues or their complicity in creating their legal
issues.152
In other settings, such as when clients are general counsels who have
similar backgrounds to the lawyer, the lawyer might facilitate trust through
demonstrations of competence; for example, by discussing previous trans-
actions, previous employment, or the lawyer’s educational background. In
intra-race lawyering, as Professor Mortazavi noted, the shared race often
facilitates an initial trust.153 Recognizing that clients of color may initially
trust attorneys of color, not in spite of our race but because of it, attorneys of
color are left with a question: if being the same race creates, in our same-
race clients, a sense of connection, implicit trust, and allows them to as-
sume similar values,154 do attorneys of color use our shared race to manip-
ulate a connection with our clients?
146. Suzette Speight, Internalized Racism: One More Piece of the Puzzle, 35 COUNSELING
PSYCHOLOGIST, 126, 127 (2007) (“Racism is a process, a condition, a relationship that violates
its victims physically, socially, spiritually, materially, and psychologically.”).
147. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 340–41.
148. Speight, supra note 146, at 126–27 (“Because racism is pervasive, operating at the
interpersonal and institutional levels simultaneously, its effects are cumulative, spanning genera-
tions, individuals, time, and place—encompassing much more than discrete acts. Consequently,
psychological injury that is due to racism is not limited to that caused directly by one perpetra-
tor, at one time, in one place.”).
149. ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL
LAWYERING PRACTICE 58–65 (2013) (discussing the use of listening techniques and other inhib-




153. Mortazavi, supra note 104, at 21.
154. Anderson et al., supra note 45 (“Similar characteristics create feelings of connection,
trust, and assumptions of similar values.”).
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For attorneys of color, there is a risk that we use our racial connec-
tion to enable our clients’ trust. Attorneys of color may intentionally utter
familiar phrases or change the cadence of our speech to that typically used
only within our racial community. Further, we may rely on our shared
history to create a sense of familiarity. Upon reflection, to create connec-
tions with my low- and moderate-income clients of color, am I more
likely to share stories of spending my summers in the South Carolina
countryside eating fruit off of the tree and hanging laundry outside on
clotheslines? Do I more frequently talk about how my grandfather was the
first in his family to attend college, but strategically exclude that this very
same grandfather’s brother received his PhD and was a Dean at a major
university? Do we, as attorneys of color, pick and choose portions of our
stories that foster a sense of racial connection with the client with whom
we seek to connect? The answer is “yes.”
These choices are trust facilitators – a means to form an initial bond
to create a basis for service of a client’s legal needs. One can argue that
lawyers of all races use various techniques to engender trust with their
clients. There is, however, something duplicitous in using a client’s im-
plicit trust in same-race dynamics to effectively manipulate the client into
trusting the lawyer. This is a risk of which the attorney of color must take
note, as that manipulation, in itself, can be a breach of the very trust we, as
same-race lawyers, seek to establish.
b. The Risk of Over-Identification
Another challenge is the risk of over-identifying with the client,
clouding the lawyer’s objectivity. For attorneys of color representing same-
race clients, it is tempting for both parties to assume shared injuries from
assumptions of shared racial experiences. Nevertheless, there is a risk of
over-identifying with fellow members of the same race that might endan-
ger the objectivity a lawyer needs to be an effective counselor.155 The
lawyer of color risks making assumptions about the client’s needs, prefer-
ences, and reactions based on the lawyer’s over-identification with the cli-
ent. For example, the lawyer’s assumptions about how his African-
American male client reacted to an unwarranted police search can unwit-
tingly be based on the lawyer’s experience as an African-American man
subjected to unwarranted police searches.
This over-identification risks the lawyer’s objectivity and the client’s
decision-making autonomy. In these instances, attorneys of color must
separate ourselves from our racial assumptions to make room for the cli-
ent’s independent thought and unimpeded decisions. Sadly, this risks les-
sening the very racial solidarity that the attorney of color originally may
155. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 347 (“In the context of a professional relationship, if
we overidentify with a client, we run the risk of making inappropriate assumptions, and our
professional judgment and professional boundaries can become clouded.”).
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have sought in the intra-race legal representation. However, if the lawyer
understands the importance of recognizing the differences with a client,
despite overt similarities, lawyers can avoid “[substituting] their own judg-
ment for the client’s as a result of over-identification or transference.”156
The other over-identification risk is the risk of an assumed familiar-
ity. Our shared histories, our shared struggles, and our common exper-
iences with discrimination create an assumption of sameness and facilitate
extensions of trust.157 For those of us within a group, such as persons of
color, we often assume a familiarity with the cultural norms of that group
solely from our membership in that group and from participating as a
member of that group. Many attorneys of color would never think to at-
tend training on how to interact with members of our own demographic;
we assume, by virtue of our membership in that demographic, that we
know the cultural norms and understand many of those norms’ nu-
ances.158 However, it is important to recognize our differences, which
within a race can still be stark, as well as the uniqueness of each individual
and her history and circumstance.159 Race alone does not create a sustaina-
ble bridge. The initial connection we make in intra-race legal representa-
tion may be based on race, but that is not enough for the connection to
endure.
c. The Risk of Power Imbalance
If you can control a man’s thinking you do not have to worry
about his action. When you determine what a man shall think
you do not have to concern yourself about what he will do. If
you make a man feel that he is inferior, you do not have to
compel him to accept an inferior status, for he will seek it him-
self. If you make a man think that he is justly an outcast, you do
not have to order him to the back door. He will go without
being told; and if there is no back door, his very nature will
demand one.160
156. Bryant, supra note 62, at 42.
157. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 340–41 (“Additionally, on a more personal level,
individuals are drawn to connect with other people because of shared experiences and personal
characteristics. These connections often help people establish rapport, trust, and engagement.
Surely these same benefits would apply in the lawyer-client relationship, where a lawyer’s ability
to find common links with her client would facilitate the lawyering process.”).
158. ROSALDO, supra note 76, at 26 (“Human beings cannot help but learn the culture or
cultures of the communities within which they grow up. . . Cultures are learned, not genetically
encoded.”).
159. Anderson et al., supra note 45, at 372–73 (“Understanding multiple identities, intra-
group differences, and the fact that each of us within any one of our group affiliations is uniquely
situated, is critical to understanding the complexities of connection and divide.”).
160. Carter Godwin Woodson, The Mis-Education of the Negro, THE ASSOCIATED PUBLISH-
ERS INC. at 84–85 (1933).
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A lawyer must be wary when creating trust with a client, for with
trust comes power.161 If clients of color trust attorneys of color more be-
cause of their shared race, that higher level of trust creates the risk of a
greater power imbalance in intra-race legal representation. For example,
although the client might attend the negotiations, they will often defer to
the attorney’s expertise during the negotiation.162 Attorneys of color must
exercise greater caution in respecting the power balance. Many attorneys
of color are painfully aware of the dangers of uncontrolled exercise of
power given our racial histories. As such, it is important to be sensitive to
the power we, as attorneys of color, have in the lives of our same-race
clients and the responsibilities we have to maintain a healthy power balance
with our clients.163
d. The Risk of Intra-Race Bias
There are many studies evaluating the roles that explicit and implicit
bias play in how we interact with each other when respondents are of
different races.164 There is less evaluation of how implicit bias affects re-
spondents of the same race. Explicit bias “reflects the attitudes or beliefs
that one endorses at a conscious level” while implicit bias is much more
subtle, reflecting implicit attitudes and stereotypes individuals may not
consciously recognize.165
Individuals tend to hold positive attitudes about themselves and trans-
fer those positive feelings to others who share the same attributes.166 Con-
versely, the positive feelings about members of one’s own group create
intergroup bias, or less favorable feelings, about members of another
161. Weng, supra note 45, at 380 (“Even though client-centered lawyering focuses on re-
specting and empowering the client, it does not address the dynamics of power and subordina-
tion (historical, actual or perceived) in the attorney-client interaction.”).
162. Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy,
43 HASTINGS L. J. 947, 952 (1992) (“Lawyers see clients as persons to be helped, as powerless
persons who need to have problems solved through the intervention of the lawyer and her skills.
Even if the result of such intervention were good for the client’s material existence, that gain
might come at the expense of the client’s sense of control over her life, her self-esteem, her
power.”).
163. See Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault’s Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative
Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. R. 395 (2004), for a more expansive view of the power balance be-
tween lawyers and clients.
164. See, e.g., Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http:/
/www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/Implicit%
20Bias%20FAQs%20rev.ashx.
165. Id. at 1 (“Unlike explicit bias (which reflects the attitudes or beliefs that one endorses at
a conscious level), implicit bias is the bias in judgment and/or behavior that results from subtle
cognitive processes (e.g., implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes) that often operate at a level
below conscious awareness and without intentional control.”).
166. Id. at 4 (“People tend to possess consistent and strongly positive attitudes toward
themselves, and this positive attitude about the self can transfer very easily to other things, peo-
ple, and groups that share attributes with the self . . . .”).
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group.167 Part of the challenge regarding intra-race legal representation is
when lawyers of color do not view their clients of color as members of the
lawyer’s self-defined ‘group’. This separation might be based on differences
in the lawyer’s and client’s economic status, education status, or social sta-
tus. If the lawyer views the client as an “other” and fears being associated
in that “other” group, there is a risk that the lawyer could exhibit bias
against the client, to reinforce the lawyer’s inclusion in the lawyer’s group,
or more caustically, to demonstrate the lawyer’s exclusion from the client’s
group.168
In intra-race legal representation, this can translate to “representative
acquiescence”169 where the attorney exhibits bias to the client in an at-
tempt to distance the lawyer from the ugly stereotypes plaguing the law-
yer’s race. As Professor Margaret M. Russell stated, “[a]ttorneys of color
often find that they are identified, categorized, and evaluated first as mem-
bers of their racial group, and only secondarily – if at all – as lawyers.”170
When walking through a courtroom or negotiating a plea bargain, does
that lawyer’s need to avoid association with racial stereotypes create a need
to establish that the lawyer is not like “them?”171
As a repeat player in a predominantly white, male profession, it is not
unexpected that an attorney of color may feel compelled to talk or dress in
a manner to demonstrate to external parties the attorney’s separation from
the client. I contend that we, as lawyers of color, cannot state absolutely
that we are still not affected by the stereotypes cast upon our racial com-
munities, especially when we represent members of our race and especially
when a client exhibits traits of racial stereotypes.172 We must recognize that
we are not immune from exhibiting the same implicit bias against our own
clients that we, as attorneys of color, have experienced.
167. Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 575, 576 (2002)
(“Intergroup bias refers generally to the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership
group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a nonmembership group (the out-
group) or its members.”).
168. Weng, supra note 45, at 394 (“Based on one’s own characteristics, a person sorts
others into ‘in-groups’ sharing characteristics with the perceiver and ‘out-groups’ that do not.
The separation of others into in-groups and out-groups further influences the way in which the
perceiver views others.”).
169. Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from Chicago’s
Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 141–42 (2012)
(“[B]oth individual and organizational stakeholder representatives may also unwittingly act op-
portunistically. Chicago’s original public housing residents. . . have been vilified. . . as lazy,
undeserving and prone to manipulating public resources. . . In order to counteract such narra-
tives and improve their social status in the network, public housing resident representatives may
unintentionally acquiesce in decisions that further the interests of the wealthier or more empow-
ered stakeholders . . . “).
170. Russell, supra note 122, at 767.
171. See Polikoff, supra note 1, 449–50.
172. Laura Padilla, But, You’re Not a Dirty Mexican: Internalized Oppression, Latinos and the
Law, 7 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 59 (2001).
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3. Unhappy Truths
a. Being Accepted versus Being Acceptable
Listen – Being a Mexican-American is tough. “Anglos” jump
all over you if you don’t speak English perfectly. Mexicans
jump all over you if you don’t speak Spanish perfectly. We gotta
be twice as perfect as anybody else. . . . Our family has been
here for centuries and yet they treat us as if we just swam across
the Rio Grande. . . . we gotta prove to the Mexicans how
Mexican we are and we gotta prove to the Americans how
American we are. We gotta be more Mexican than the Mexi-
cans and more American than the Americans both at the same
time. It’s exhausting!173
Attorneys of color are faced with the overwhelming task of: 1) trying
to be an objective lawyer, 2) while remaining equally faithful to our clients
and our racial representativeness, while 3) also trying to work in, and be an
integral part of, a White-dominated profession.174 Professor Wilkins argues
that attorneys of color, who are often subjected to discrimination based on
their non-professional racial identities, are thus incentivized to be “viewed
as lawyers simpliciter” – a lawyer separate from their racial identities- to free
them from the pervasive negative stereotypes that accompanies their non-
professional identities.175
Earlier generations of African-American professionals arguably had
more challenge in proving worthiness while combating stereotypes from
slavery.176 In the early years after slavery, African-American intellectuals
shared a sense of responsibility for disproving racist assertions that African-
Americans lacked the intellectual prowess of other races.177 It was chal-
lenging for African American scholars to “represent” for their race when
they felt forced to thread the needle between pursuits of their intellect and
173. SELENA (Q-Productions 1997).
174. MACK, supra note 135, at 6 (“But to be a successful lawyer, one had to also represent
the core identity of what was a white-dominated profession.”); see also Corey S. Shdaimah,
Lawyers and the Power of Community: The Story of South Ardmore, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 595,
599 (2009) (“[Lawyers] are also tied to the establishment in various ways, which can make their
motivation (and advice) suspect. Lawyers need to be seen as “normal” to establishment figures.”).
175. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1505 (“The universalizing claims made on behalf of the
professional self suggest that differences among lawyers that might matter outside the professional
sphere are irrelevant when evaluating the professional practices of lawyers. This universalizing
tendency is arguably particularly important for new entrants into the legal profession, who are
frequently subject to discrimination on the basis of certain aspects of their non-professional
identities.”).
176. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, The Dilemma of the American Negro Scholar, in RACE AND
HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 1938–1988, 295, 299 (1989).
177. Id.
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advocating for their race.178 As John Hope Franklin noted so many years
ago: “It must have been a most unrewarding experience for the Negro
scholar to answer those who said that he was inferior by declaring: ‘I am
indeed not inferior.’ For such a dialogue left little or no time for the pursuit
of knowledge as one really desired to pursue it.”179 Some intellectuals, like
W.E.B. Dubois, responded to this challenge by moving beyond their pre-
ferred profession to become a scholar.180 Others moved beyond their pre-
ferred profession to become advocates of their race.181
b. Insider to Outsider
Much has been written about the challenges of cross-cultural lawyer-
ing and how a lawyer’s own cultural biases will impact how the lawyer
interacts with, understands, and counsels the client.182 Professor Michelle
Jacobs notes that lawyers and clients may have difficulty communicating
when they are of different races because of the vast cultural differences
between them.183 This cross-cultural bias is easier to understand when the
lawyer and the client have different cultures. Attorneys of color with same-
race clients but different socio-economic backgrounds exist in a strange
world: our common race creates a comfortable starting point to establish
trust; however, our different socio-economic background and life exper-
iences mean our shared race is often where the commonality ends. We, as
attorneys of color, must accept a strange insight—cross-culture lawyering
is not solely for those of different races, cultures or religions. Those of us
who are of the same race and culture as our clients may have many of the
same differences that inhibit connection and communication.
When attorneys of color consider same-race clients, do we truly see
ourselves in them? We are separate—our opportunities, how we view the
law, how the judicial system views us as professionals—we are impacted by
how we want the client to view us, how we need external parties to view
us, and how we view our clients. We, as attorneys of color, must recognize
these factors to prevent us from being bound by them.
As a lawyer, I try to determine how best to serve my clients’ interests.
And, as with many lawyers, that requires trying to understand the needs of
my clients when their needs are generally so different from my own. In my
178. Id. at 305–06 (“He must therefore, be permitted to function as vigorously as his ener-
gies and resources allow, in order to elevate himself and those of his group to a position where
they will be accepted and respected in the American social order.”).
179. Id. at 299.
180. See generally DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS, 1868–1919: BIOGRAPHY OF
RACE (1993).
181. Franklin, supra note 176, at 299.
182. Bryant, supra note 62 at 40–41 (“Cross-cultural lawyering occurs when lawyers and
clients have different ethnic or cultural heritages and when they are socialized by different subsets
within ethnic groups.”).
183. See generally Jacobs, supra note 53.
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practice, I represent low- and moderate-income individuals when I have
never been either of those. I am working to help them purchase their first
home when every direct family member from my formerly enslaved great-
great-great grandmother to, and including myself, has owned a home. We
are of one race, but of two worlds. The individual members of the tenants
associations with whom I worked, often women of color, frequently spoke
of feelings of helplessness. I, however, have rarely felt disempowered—
neither as a person of color, nor as a female, two groups that historically
have been oppressed and devalued. When I talked with residents about the
ability to purchase their apartment buildings and to become first-time
homeowners, the residents were so often skeptical. Initially, this surprised
me. I recognized the challenges of trying to purchase their apartment
buildings, but I was confused by their unwillingness to try. When asked,
they would tell me story after story of their efforts to change their lives
with little success. With each setback, the residents’ willingness to believe
in their ability to change their lives decreased. The feelings of helplessness
and powerlessness took hold. I have neither experienced these feelings of
powerlessness nor doubted my ability to effect change in my life.
Low- and moderate-income same-race clients and attorneys are of
the same race, but often their experiences are very different. It is likely that
our legal training and financial stability provide us a greater sense of power
and confidence in our ability to navigate life’s challenges. However, our
legal training alone is unlikely to account for such a divergent sense of
power. Rather, part of the sense of power comes from our differing educa-
tional backgrounds, upbringings, and income levels. We must acknowl-
edge that as attorneys, society often does not treat us as helpless. This
impacts our reaction to situations that might otherwise disempower us.184
We, as attorneys of color, must appreciate the differences in our exper-
iences and our clients’ experiences that lead us to these very different con-
clusions about our ability to effect change in our lives.
CONCLUSION: AM I MY CLIENT?
After considering the dynamics, the risks, and the unhappy truths
about intra-race legal representations, attorneys of color are left to ponder
whether we see ourselves in our clients.
My clients often look to me to help them through their legal issues,
assuming that our cultural differences are minimal. My clients tell me that
they trust my counsel more because I can better understand their issues.
For many years, I shared that sentiment and, to a certain extent, I still cling
to it.
184. ROSALDO, supra note 76, at xii (“When people become accustomed to privilege, it
appears to be a vested right, a status that is natural and well deserved, a part of the order of
things.”).
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But, my community—my race—is no longer monolithic. The diver-
gence of our lives after slavery and Jim Crow created chasms between us
that can be as great as those of different races. I cling to our sameness, for
their sacrifices made my successes possible. But, this dishonesty endangers
my ability to be an objective lawyer. My clients do not accept my counsel
with the same skepticism they do of outsiders. I understand the argument
that I should disabuse them of this trust because it is based on a similarity
that does not exist. I have been unable to separate myself from my clients
in this manner. I do not want that division, for I value the warmth of
belonging. With that though, I am left with uncomfortable questions: If I
use our shared race to connect with my clients, is that an abusive manipu-
lation? Am I the fox in the very hen house I seek to protect? I am left
wondering whether my unwillingness to separate myself makes me as dan-
gerous as those from whom I seek to protect my clients.
Representing my low- and moderate-income clients of color has
been difficult at times because, in many ways, I still see shadows of myself
in my clients and I still feel such a sense of responsibility to honor their
sacrifices and fight the biases that oppressed them. I look at our history and
it is wrought with countless stories of fights and pleas for civil rights for
African-Americans. Stories abound of protests for desegregation of univer-
sities, neighborhoods, and public facilities. As a member of the recipient
generation—those of us in the post-Civil Rights Movement generation—
I, and others, feel the weight of the debt owed to those whose fights won
our natural-born freedom. When I began my legal career practicing at a
large law firm, I felt a need to prove my worth. Not solely my worth as a
practicing attorney, but actually my worth of the sacrifices made on my
behalf, and my worth of the opportunities afforded me. I needed to be one
of those who “made it.” I needed to show that the sacrifices made by
African-Americans before me were justified. I needed to prove my worth.
I still feel the urgency to prove that we, the recipient generation, are wor-
thy of our ancestors’ sacrifices.
I struggle with how to bridge the cross-cultural divide with my cli-
ents because we share such history. But with so many of my clients of
color, we hail from vastly different experiences. I accept that we, as law-
yers, are better able to serve all our clients when we are honest about how
race impacts our legal representation. Upon reflection, the fragility of the
racial connection I felt to my clients has deepened. Yet my sense of obliga-
tion to them never wanes. Despite the truth of our differences, I still see
glimpses of myself in my clients. Ultimately, neither racial commonalities,
nor shared histories, nor years of working in the same community can
bridge the gaps between me, as the lawyer, and my clients.
My clients may want to trust me more because they see racial famili-
arity when they look upon me, but the differences between us create a gap
that is insurmountable. I remain the person they seek for guidance and
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counsel. I must remain the objective lawyer. In that moment of seeking my
legal assistance, I am the other.185 It is not I who I see when I look at
them. I am not my client.186
***
185. Shdaimah, supra note 174, at 599 (“Lawyers’ professional role, one that must be as-
sumed in order to be of value to the clients, alienates them from these groups in a way that is
often distressing to lawyers who align themselves with their clients politically and
philosophically.”).
186. Polikoff, supra note 1, at 470 (Polikoff concludes: “Am I my client? The answer is a
resounding, and sometimes agonizing, ‘No.’”).
